r*

The ECB's New Strategy: Codifying Existing Practice . . . plus

When the ECB began operation in 1999, many observers focused on its differences from the Federal Reserve. Yet, since the start, the ECB was much like the Fed. And, over the past two decades, the ECB and the Fed have learned a great deal from each other, furthering convergence.

Against this background, it is unsurprising that the broad monetary policy strategies in the United States and the euro area converged as well. On July 8, the ECB published the culmination of the strategy review that began in early 2020, the first since 2003. The implementation of the new strategy comes nearly one year after the Fed revised its longer-run goals in August 2020 (see our earlier posts here and here).

If past is prologue, observers will exaggerate the differences. Perhaps most obvious, unlike the Fed, the ECB’s strategic update did not introduce an averaging framework in which they would “make up” for past errors. Nevertheless, we suspect that it will be difficult to distinguish most Fed and ECB policy actions based on the modest differences in their strategic frameworks. For the most part, both revised strategies codify existing practice, as they permit extensive discretion in how they employ their growing set of policy tools.

In this post, we summarize the motivations for the ECB’s new strategy and describe three notable changes: target 2% inflation, symmetrically and unambiguously; integrate climate change into the framework; and outline a plan to introduce owner-occupied housing into the price index they target (the euro area harmonised index of consumer prices). While the new strategy can help the ECB achieve its price stability mandate, in our view the overall impact of the revisions is likely to be modest….

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Climate Finance

Climate change is the topic of the day. The World Meteorological Organization tells us that the 2011-20 decade was the warmest on record. Earlier this year, the U.S. government re-joined the Paris Accord, and is proposing a range of new programs to mitigate the long-run impact of climate change. Now that a warming planet has made the Arctic increasingly navigable, national security specialists are concerned about geopolitical risks there. Thousands of economists have endorsed a carbon tax. Even central banks have joined together to form the Network for the Greening of the Financial System—a forum to discuss how to take account of climate change in assessing financial stability.

Against that background, last month, NYU Stern’s Volatility and Risk Institute (VRI) held a conference on finance and climate change. Speakers addressed issues ranging from the modeling and measurement of climate risk in finance to assessing its impact on the resilience of the financial system. In this post, we primarily focus on one of the central challenges facing policymakers and practitioners: what is the appropriate discount rate for evaluating the relative costs and benefits of investments in climate change mitigation that will not pay off for decades? We also comment briefly on several other issues in the rapidly growing field of climate finance research.

Past responses to the discount-rate question vary widely. Some observers call for a discount rate matching the high expected return on long-lived, risky assets—a number as high as 7%. This would imply a very low present value of benefits from investments to mitigate climate change, consistent with only modest current expenditures. Others postulate that climate change could lead to the extinction of humanity. For plausible discount rates, the specter of a nearly infinite loss means that virtually any level of mitigation investment is warranted (see, for example, Holt).

Recent climate finance research that we summarize here comes to the conclusion that over any reasonable horizon, the appropriate discount rate for computing the net present value of investments in climate change mitigation should be relatively low….

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What's in store for r*?

It is amazing how things we once thought impossible, or at least extremely improbable, can become commonplace. Ten-year government bond yields in most of Europe and Japan are at or below zero. And, for U.S. Treasurys, the yield has been below 1 percent since March.

A confluence of factors has come together to deliver these incredibly low interest rates. Most importantly, inflation is far lower and much more stable than it was 30 years ago. Second, monetary policy remains extremely accommodative, with policy rates stuck around zero (or below!) for the past decade in Europe and Japan, and only temporarily higher in the United States. Third, the equilibrium (or natural) real interest rate (r*)—the rate consistent in the longer run with stable inflation and full employment—has fallen by roughly 2 percentage points since 2008 and is now only 0.5% or lower.

How long will this go on? What’s in store for r*? Focusing on the United States, in this post we discuss the large post-2007 decline in r* that followed a gradual downward trend in prior decades. After considering various possible explanations, we focus on the change in U.S. saving behavior. Around 2008, there was an abrupt increase in household savings relative to wealth and income. Combined with increased foreign demand for U.S. assets, this appears to be a key culprit behind the recent fall in r*.

We doubt that this will change anytime soon….

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The Fed's Crystal Ball: Looking Beyond the COVID-19 Recession

Over the past 75 years, no one has seen anything like the COVID-19 shock to the global economy. Nor have we seen anything like the swift, broad and massive fiscal and monetary expansion that followed.

In the United States, the economic rebound has started. As states and municipalities relax the lockdown, businesses closed by the virus are gradually reopening and employment is rising. But, there remains tremendous uncertainty about the speed and extent of the recovery.

This was the backdrop for the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) release last week of its June Summary of Economic Projections (SEP)—the first SEP since December. Unsurprisingly, attention usually focuses on the FOMC’s interest rate projections: with the exception of two participants, the Committee does not anticipate an interest rate increase over the forecast horizon to the end of 2022.

In this post, we concentrate on the Committee’s projections for the real economy. Our conclusion is that these contain two elements of optimism. First, while the recession is clearly the worst since the 1930s, FOMC participants believe that the recovery will be roughly twice as fast as the one from the GFC. Second, their projections are that longer-run economic growth will match the pre-COVID pace. That is, in contrast to the GFC experience, COVID-19 will not usher in a slowdown in trend growth. Compared to the FOMC, we believe there is room for disappointment, especially with regard to the longer run.

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Negative Nominal Interest Rates: A Primer

Many people find negative interest rates confusing. Why should anyone pay a bank to make a deposit? Why should a bank pay someone to borrow? How can we value an asset with a future cash flow when the interest rate is negative?

Policymakers also wonder whether the effects of negative interest rates on the economy are favorable or unfavorable. Do negative interest rates help central banks achieve price stability by stimulating economic activity? Do negative rates spur banks to make more good loans or to evergreen bad ones? Will borrowers and banks take on too much risk because they can fund investments at a negative rate? Will households reduce their saving rate because the return is so low, or raise it because low returns leave them farther from their wealth target? Will negative rates influence the ability of pension funds, insurance companies and governments to make good on their long-term promises to future retirees?

In this primer, we examine these questions, starting with key facts about negative nominal interest rates. Our conclusion: there is little magic about having a slightly negative, as opposed to slightly positive interest rates. Thus, much of the criticism of persistently negative nominal interest rates applies similarly to very low, but positive rates. That said, financial system frictions limit the favorable impact from modestly negative nominal rates, but our experience with them remains limited. Given the likely need for unconventional policy tools to address the next recession, learning more about the benefits and costs of negative nominal interest rates is a high priority….

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Dot-ology: What can we learn from the dot plot?

The primary objective of monetary policy is to keep inflation and unemployment low and stable. To be effective, central bankers must address shocks to inflation and unemployment, while ensuring that what they say and do is not a source of volatility. One way to make a commitment to stability credible is for policymakers to broadcast their likely responses to shocks—their reaction function. Such transparency escalates the cost of reneging, helping to anchor expectations about the future that influence current behavior (see our primer on time consistency). And, because they can anticipate how policy will respond to changes in economic and financial conditions, it improves everyone’s economic and financial decisions.

With such a stability-oriented policy strategy, the policy path will depend on what happens in a changing world. Only under specific circumstances―such as when the short-term interest rate is at or near its effective lower bound―will policymakers be inclined to commit to a specific future policy path.

Recently, we wrote about the remarkable evolution of Federal Reserve monetary policy communication over the past quarter century. Today, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) publishes statements, minutes, and quarterly forecasts for growth, inflation, unemployment, and interest rates. In this post we take up a narrow question: What can we learn from the information published in the FOMC’s quarterly Summary of Economic Projections (SEP)?

Our answer is: quite a bit. The data allow us to estimate not only an FOMC reaction function, but also a short-run projection of the equilibrium real rate of interest (r*)―one that is consistent with projected economic conditions over a two- to three-year horizon—in addition to the long-run r* that is implicit in each SEP. While there is almost surely room to improve on the SEP, we conclude, as a friend and expert Fed watcher once suggested, “Don’t ditch the dots” ….

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Navigating in Cloudy Skies

Stargazers hate clouds. Even modest levels of humidity and wind make it hard to “see” the wonders of the night sky. Very few places on our planet have consistently clear, dark skies.

Central bankers face a similar, albeit earthly, challenge. Even the simplest economic models require estimation of unobservable factors; something that generates considerable uncertainty. As Vice Chairman Clarida recently explained, the Fed depends on new data not only to assess the current state of the U.S. economy, but also to pin down the factors that drive a wide range of models that guide policymakers’ decisions.

In this post, we highlight how the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC’s) views of two of those “starry” guides—the natural rates of interest (r*) and unemployment (u*)—have evolved in recent years. Like sailors under a cloudy sky, central bankers may need to shift course when the clouds part, revealing that they incorrectly estimated these economic stars. The uncertainty resulting from unavoidable imprecision not only affects policy setting, but also complicates policymakers’ communication, which is one of the keys to making policy effective….

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Trump v. Fed

Last month, interrupting decades of presidential self-restraint, President Trump openly criticized the Federal Reserve. Given the President’s penchant for dismissing valuable institutions, it is hard to be surprised. Perhaps more surprising is the high quality of his appointments to the Board of Governors. Against that background, the limited financial market reaction to the President’s comments suggests that investors are reasonably focused on the selection of qualified academics and individuals with valuable policy and business experience, rather than a few early-morning words of reproof.

Nevertheless, the President’s comments are seriously disturbing and—were they to become routine—risk undermining the significant benefits that Federal Reserve independence brings. Importantly, the criticism occurred despite sustained strength in the economy and financial markets, and despite the stimulative monetary and fiscal policies in place….

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